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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 3, 1967, Dr. Christiaan N. Barnard, a South African
surgeon made medical history at Groote Schuur Hospital in Capetown
when he successfully replaced the damaged heart of 53 year old Louis
Washlansky with that of a 25 year-old woman who died of brain injuries
suffered in an automobile accident. Although Washlansky survived only
eighteen days,' the magnitude of the feat (as well as later heart trans-
plants) brought public attention to the medical profession and the possible
role that organ transplantation may play in the future of mankind. The
heart transplantation has brought to the surface many of the issues that
were always present in transplantation but were not thought important
enough to be raised to any great degree. The heart has been considered the
traditional seat of life and its transplantation has aroused laymen, doctors,
and lawyers to the point where they are constantly formulating new ethical,
legal, medical, and moral problems. The purpose of this paper is to
point out these problems and how lawyers may play a role in their solution.
Lawyers have generally been considered the protector of the individual and
have a professional responsibility to continue in that role.
Some of the problems presented and discussed herein are long term and
therefore may be attacked methodically; others are short term problems
that must be solved quickly in order that the future of transplantation is
beneficial to mankind. This paper makes the general assumption that
organ transplants, properly carried out, are beneficial to mankind in that
they save lives. This in itself is reason enough to go to great expense to
resolve the problems. In order to fulfill his professional responsibility the
lawyer must strike a balance between two competing interests: (1) the
medical profession which desires to perfect surgical procedures and which,
in doing so, may become over zealous and cause transplants to be performed
in situations where it is unnecessary and may actually waste lives; and (2)
those individuals who are close to death and may be saved only by a trans-
plantation which must be performed correctly to be of any benefit.
The legal profession, with its training in the decision making process,
is the only group which can harmonize these competing interests in such a
manner that the medical profession achieves its desired expertise in trans-
plantation surgery while the lay public remains free of any fear about be-
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ing an experimental guinea pig. The problem is not easy, however, and
the lawyer will have to concern himself with the long range effects of
transplantation if he is to be successful.
The problems to be considered include the following: (1) who may
be a donor; (2) may a minor donate his organs; (3) what constitutes in-
formed consent; (4) what is the definition of death; (5) who determines
death; (6) may gifts of organs be revoked; (7) what are the rights of
next-of-kin at death; (8) how are gifts of organs made; (9) may donors re-
ceive payment for their organs; (10) should treating physicians be allowed
to participate in the transplantation of their patients' organs; (11) what
controls should be placed on physicians; (12) if there is a limited supply
of donated organs, who is the recipient; (13) who chooses this recipient;
and (14) what criteria are used in determining the donor. These are just
a few of the problems involved. It should be observed that the problems
are legal, medical, moral, and ethical and this prevents any easy solution.
However, the lawyer has his responsibility and especially so when the prob-
lems are difficult.
After a brief look into the medical aspects of organ transplantation,
the individual problems and their solutions, or means to solution will be
discussed individually. Initially the several kinds of donors will be dis-
cussed and the problems and possible solutions each type presents. The
recipients and the classes that may develop are then presented along with
their attendent problems and possible solutions.
II. MEDICAL BACKGROUND
In order to fully comprehend the legal and moral issues involved in
tissue transplantation, it is necessary to understand the medical parameters.
This writer has a fairly comprehensive understanding of the medical pro-
cedure involved in performing a kidney transplant; and, as kidney trans-
plants present problems typical of all transplant procedures, they will be
used as the model for discussion.
Transplantation of tissues is not a new medical technique. Skin grafts
outdate the birth of Christ and human blood transfusions have been per-
formed for over one hundred-fifty years. Transplants of the cornea, with
which non-medical personnel are generally familiar, are also of long stand-
ing.2 In 1954 at the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in Boston, Massachu-
setts, Dr. Joseph Murray performed the first successful kidney trans-
plantation when he transplanted a healthy kidney from an adult male to
his identical twin brother.3 It was at this time that tissue transplantation
came of age and achieved a permanent place in the medical world. Prior
to that time physicians and surgeons believed that the operation could be
2 Stason, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 23 BUS. LAw. 919 (1968).
3 CALNE, RENAL TRANSPLANTATION 21 (1967).
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performed but were always confronted by the rejection mechanism in non-
identical twin recipients. This transplantation was made possible by the
earlier work of Alexis Carrel who had perfected the necessary surgical
techniques in animals4 and William J. Kolff who had constructed the first
artificial kidney in the Netherlands in 1943." Kolff's artificial kidney has
been greatly improved upon and modified by the staff at Peter Bent Brig-
ham Hospital8 and plays an important part in keeping a transplant patient
alive until a suitable donor can be found to provide a kidney.
The kidneys function in removing the waste products that result from
bodily metabolism and maintain the body's salt and water balance. An ac-
cumulation of waste products (uremia) results when the kidneys are un-
able to function because of a disease such as glomerulonephritis or pyelone-
phritis. As a result there is a poisoning of the blood and the patient dies
if medical aid is not available. Medical aid is either hemodialysis by means
of Kolff's artificial kidney or peritoneal dialysis. In the artificial kidney
blood is passed through a long cellophane tube bathed in a dialyzing solu-
tion and back into an artery. The cellophane tube, a semipermeable mem-
brane, acts like the tissue layer in the kidney which serves as a filter. The
dialyzing solution is lower in concentration than the blood so low molec-
ular weight waste products diffuse through the cellophane into the
dialyzing solution. By this process the waste products in the blood may be
removed over a period of six to ten hours.7 In 1966 the process of peri-
toneal dialysis was introduced into the medical practice. In this process
the peritoneum of the kidney patient is the semi-permeable membrane.
The patient's abdomen is punctured immediately below the umbilicus and
a plastic catheter is inserted. The dialyzing solution, in two liter quantities,
is then pumped into the patient by gravity flow, at which time the flow is
reversed with the dialyzing solution flowing back out containing those
waste products which crossed the peritoneum due to the differing concen-
trations. This process takes anywhere from eight to sixteen hours, de-
pending on how many liters are pumped into the patient and how well the
procedure works for that particular patient.
The procedure leading up to the transplant is simple and uniform
throughout the country. The patient enters a large hospital (generally
large teaching hospitals are the only ones that do dialysis and organ trans-
plants) with a fatal renal disease. The artificial kidney or peritoneal
dialysis is used in one of two ways: it either supplements the actual
work of the kidney thereby allowing them to rest and make repairs or it
4 Carrel, The Preservation of Tissues and its Application in Surgery, 59 J.A.MA. 523
(1912).
5 BrrTANIcA, BOOK OF THE YEAR 1967, 529.
6MooRE, GIVE AND TAKE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION 56
(1964) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
7 BRITANNicA, supra note 5, at 529.
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carries on all the kidney functions until a suitable donor can be found.
Often times the patient suffering chronic renal disease is dialyzed several
times and then is allowed to return home and report to the hospital only
once or twice a week for treatments until a donor is found.
Finding a donor is one of the greatest problems the chronic renal pa-
tient (and the physician) is faced with. There are two reasons for this.
Generally people are not overly anxious to part with their organs and
those who are must satisfy certain immunological criteria. When any for-
eign body or substance is injected or placed in a human being a rejection
mechanism commences. That is, a human's lymphocytes begin to attack
any substance which it does not recognize as itself. There are degrees of
rejection depending on how great the tissues differ from each other immu-
nologically. This difference, which is non-existent in idential twins be-
cause they develop from the same fertilized egg, is measured by means of a
histocompatability test and is somewhat analogous to blood typing. Gen-
erally, the closer two people are genetically the more probable it is that
their tissues will be compatible and thus one may serve as a donor for the
other.
Once a compatible donor has been found and the appropriate consent
obtained the surgical procedure begins. This procedure is generally the
same in most hospitals. The donor (regardless of whether he is alive or
has expired) and the recipient are placed in adjoining operating rooms.
The recipient is prepared' to receive the new kidney while the donor
undergoes a nephrectomy (removal of the kidney). The kidney is then
transferred from one operating room to the other where it is surgically im-
planted into the recipient who is then removed to the intensive care unit
for close observation and a period of convalescence.
In addition to the surgeon's ability and technique the most important
factors of the operation are the time the operation consumes and the
temperature of the kidney being transplanted. The critical time in organ
transplantation is the ischemic interval which is the period of time begin-
ning when circulation of blood to the donor's kidney is cut off in the
donor until it is reestablished in the recipient. The critical temperature is
the temperature of the tissue being transplanted during the ischemic inter-
val." The critical nature of these factors is not difficult to understand.
The various cells of the body succumb to a lack of oxygen (anoxemia) at
different rates. This distinction is irreversible and increases as the critical
time and temperature increase. Kidneys which have been removed with-
out cooling can be transplanted successfully if the time interval is one hour
or less. A tissue transplant is considered successful if it will carry out its
8 Some recipients have their diseased kidneys removed before the transplant, some at the time
of the transplant and in some the diseased kidneys remain in the donor and are joined by the
transplanted kidney.
9 MOORE, at 135.
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normal cellular functions upon implantation into its new host with a re-
sumed arterial oxygen supply.
The critical temperature for most tissues appears to be around 250C. Be-
low this temperature, many organs can be kept alive for several hours
without blood flow. If the temperature is reduced to 150C, or lower
to the freezing point, additional preservation is gained, but there are some
problems of damage to tissues, particularly if freezing is produced and
the cells swell and break.' 0
As an aid in preserving organs for short periods of time there has been
developed a hyperbaric organ preservation chamber. This apparatus con-
sists of a chamber into which the nephrectomized kidney is placed. The
kidney is then perfused with a 5 to 8' C, 5 percent low molecular weight
dextran solution under hyperbaric conditions of three atmospheres pres-
sure.1 By means of this method a human kidney was successfully stored
for eight hours.'2
The liver, the heart, and the lungs have also been the subject of at-
tempted organ transplants. Their critical time is ten to fifteen minutes.
While that of the brain, which has not as yet been transplanted, is three
to six minutes, at which time "there is absolute cessation of brain function,
reflexes cease, the pupils become widely dilated [and] the electroencephalo-
gram [a record of the electrical activity of the brain] shows no activity."' 3
It will be shown that the present time limitations imposed upon the trans-
plant surgeon result in several severe legal questions.
Immunological rejection is the process by which the lymphocytes of the
body fight off all foreign tissue which it does not recognize as "self."
There have been numerous efforts to suppress this rejection mechanism.
The first attempt was whole body irradiation which was a destruction of
the antibody producing sells. The main problem with this method was that
the dose of irradiation could not be correctly calculated. If too much
irradiation was given, the tissue graft would be successful but the body's
defenses would be lowered to such an extent that the patient would die
from infections it received after implantation and was unable to fight off.
On the other hand, if the dosage was not at a sufficiently high level, the
bodily defenses were not suppressed enough to prevent the lymphocytes
from attacking the transplanted organ. The delicate balance required
could not be achieved.14 The present means of suppression is by the use of
antilymphocyte-Globulin-commonly referred to as ALG. This substance
interfers with the lymphocytes which cause rejection. It is used in con-
MolvoORE, at 135, 136.
11 FEEMSTR, IN VITRO PRESERVATION WITH INTEPMITTENT LOW FLOW HYPERBORic,
HYPTHERMIC PROFUSION.
12 Manax, Hypothermia and Hyperbaria, 192 J.A.M.A. 755 (1965).
13 MoORE, at 132.
14 MOORE, at 81, 82.
[Vol. 31
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
nection with two standard drugs-Imuran and Prednisone.1' ALG is pre-
pared by injecting human lymphocytes into horses which then produce
antibodies to the lymphocytes. This antibody is then extracted from the
horse's serum and injected into the transplant patient where it interferes
with the production of lymphocytes to attack the newly implanted foreign
tissue. ALG seems to work although there have been allergic reactions in
patients as a result of a human reaction with some of the components of
the horse serum. This procedure is still in the experimental stage, however,
and experiments are being conducted as to how and when ALG injections
should be given and if and when they may be discontinued.
III. DONORS
Once the medical parameters of kidney transplantation are understood,
it is possible to consider the legal and moral complications which affect
the doctor, recipient, donor, and lawyer. The legal problems, which often
necessarily include moral considerations, initially deal with the donor. The
problem of informed consent places a tremendous burden on the physician.
He must confer with the potential donor; advise him of the pain and suf-
fering he may have to endure; discuss the possibility of unknown long
term complications resulting from a nephrectomy; inform him that the
procedures are still experimental and his gift may be for nothing if the
recipient dies; and relate to him the possibility of psychological trauma as
a result of losing a part of his body and not knowing if it was worth it all.
Each type of donor presents different problems, different challenges and
different solutions. For that reason the donors will be discussed according
to the particular type.
A. The Live Adult Donor
To date the most common, as well as most successful donor has been
the adult donor who is alive, healthy and a close relative of the recipient.
As explained above, the closer the donor and recipient are genetically, the
fewer immunological barriers that are likely to be encountered and the
greater the chances are that the transplant will succeed. In obtaining the
informed consent of the patient the physicians and surgeons have two ob-
jectives. First, they want to be certain that the potential donor is fully
aware of the possible consequences and repercussions of his donation and
gives his consent nonetheless. Second, as a result of such informed con-
sent, the doctors involved in the transplantation are thereby protected from
any assault or battery actions which might be brought.
In a New York case in which the plaintiff was admitted to the hospital
suffering from a stomach disorder and a fibroid tumor was surgically
15N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1968, at 8.
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removed while she was under the effects of ether and without having con-
sented to such removal the court held
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to deter-
mine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who per-
forms an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages.16
In a case in which the plaintiff was referred to a surgeon who diagnosed
his case as arteriosclerosis, the plaintiff brought a malpractice action be-
cause of the resulting paralysis of his legs. The court stated
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liabil-
ity if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an
intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise,
the physician may not minimize the known dangers of a procedure or
operation in order to induce his patient's consent. At the same time,
the physician must place the welfare of his patient above all else and
this very fact places him in a position in which he sometimes must choose
between two alternative courses of action. One is to explain to the pa-
tient every risk attendant upon any surgical procedure or operation, no
matter how remote; this may well result in alarming a patient who is al-
ready unduly apprehensive and who as a result refuse to undertake sur-
gery in which there is in fact a minimal risk; it may also result in actu-
ally increasing the risks by reason of the physiological results of the ap-
prehension itself. The other is to recognize that each patient presents
a separate problem, that the patient's mental and emotional condition is
important and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the
element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed consis-
tent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to informed consent.' 7
A minor was suffering from "spells" and a neurologist subjected the boy
to an arteriogram (a dangerous procedure in which three percentum of the
cases result in death, paralysis or other injurious outcome) which resulted
in partial paralysis to the youth. The court stated
Unless a person who gives consent to an operation knows its dangers and
the degree of danger, a "consent" does not represent a choice and is in-
effectual.' 8
With these cases in mind, two problems are created for the surgeon.
The first is how well a potential donor can understand the medical termi-
nology the surgeon uses in explaining the operation, and the possible
consequences thereof, to him. Although a donor may understand the
literal meaning of the phrases "pain and suffering" and "experimental
procedure" it is probably the case that he does not adequately comprehend
16 Schloendorff v. The Society of the New York Hospital, 221 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E.
92 (1914).
17 Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. University Board of Trustees, 154 Cal. App.2d 560, 578,
317 P.2d 170 (1957).
18 Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So.2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1964).
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the scope and meaning of the words as they are used in a medical context.
The second difficulty is that the surgeon may not be able to give the
potential donor what is commonly referred to as the "straight story." At
the present time organ transplantation is still a relatively new and experi-
mental field in which the long range effects have not as yet been studied.
In the case of the kidney there seems to be little evidence to indicate
that any serious malfunctions result. However, fifteen years [since the
first kidney transplant was successfully performed on December 23, 1954,
in Peter Bent Brigham Hospital by Dr. Joseph E. Murray,]' 9 is not long
enough to conclusively show that such malfunctions do not exist-es-
pecially when the donors have all been young and physically fit at the
time of the donation.
One major difficulty should be considered. In the human body there
are two kidneys. If one is injured the second carries on the entire metab-
olite function of both kidneys with no resultant harm to the individual.
However, if a donor, who is left with only one kidney, subsequently suf-
fers damage to his remaining kidney, he is in the same position as the re-
cipient of his kidney and is a candidate for transplant himself. Thus,
there is a definite danger in giving a kidney and the donor must be so ad-
vised.
Other problems are also present. Transplantation is experimental
and the doctors have some self-interest in performing the surgery. Pro-
motions, national acclaim, higher salaries and medical data are the results
of successful organ transplantation. With these in mind the surgeon
may be tempted to minimize any side effects which he feels might cause
the donor unwarranted consternation. At this point the physician has
made a value judgment that the small possibility of harm to be incurred
by the donor is outweighed by the potential benefit to science, the recip-
ient and, possibly, the physician himself. In this situation the donor
should have an absolute right to refuse donation for any reason he might
have, however trivial or misinformed it might be, because he will not
benefit at all from the donation. The doctor must make a full disclosure
of all the risks involved in order that the lay public maintain its respect
for the medical profession.
It is very conceivable that the courts would hold the doctor to such a
high standard where a donor is involved. Unlike the case where some
good results from a surgical procedure, the doctor here does not have to
balance the benefits to the donor against the harm and then decide what
to tell him-there are no physical benefits. The medical profession
should adopt such a position. In this way the experiments will be con-
ducted on willing subjects, public confidence in physicians will continue,
and, as a result more people will be willing to donate their organs.
19 MOORE, at 73.
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Another difficulty is the extent to which the surgeon or hospital
may be legally liable to the donor after the donation in case some serious
malfunction should occur. The doctor is responsible for good surgical
procedure and proper patient care. That is, the doctor is under no legal
obligation to care for the donor at his (the doctor's) expense or to see to
it that the hospital provides free peritoneal or hemodialysis and nursing
care should the donor develop chronic renal disease after the donation.
The donor willingly gives his informed consent and as a result suffers
the consequences which result from any risks he has assumed.
A look at several consent forms currently in use indicates several ways
in which the doctors have attempted to comply with the legal require-
ments of willing, informed consent. The Ohio State University Hospitals
use a form entitled "Authorization for Donation to a Named Beneficiary
of a Human Organ or Part by a Living Donor".20 As the title indicates,
20 AUTHORIZATION FOR DONATION TO A NAMED RECIPIENT
OF A HUMAN ORGAN OR PART BY A LIVING DONOR.
I, - of -----
name of donor street address
---------- ------------------ , do hereby evidence my consent to donate
city state
to ---------------------------- an organ or part from my body, namely,
name of recipient
----------------- , to be transplanted into the body of-----------------
item name of recipient
I further consent to and authorize the Ohio State University through its College of
Medicine and the physicians and surgeons designated by and acting for it to perform
the necessary operational procedure to accomplish the removal of said
from my body. I hereby certify that I have had explained to my satisfaction by one
or more of said physicians and surgeons the operational procedure necessary for the
accomplishment of my donation and the consequences to me thereof and of such do-
nation.
I further certify that I am over the age of 21 years and that I am unmarried* married*
and that the name of my spouse is----------------
Dated: ----------------- Time ----------- am* pm*
---------------------------- witness
------------------------------ , donor
-------------------------------------- , witness
The undersigned being the wife* husband* of the above
name of donor
does hereby certify that --------- he had read and understands the above statement
made and consent given by said ------------------- and that the consequences
name of donor
to --------------------------------- of the operation and removal of the
name of donor
----------------------------- have been satisfactorily explained to the
organ or part to be removed
undersigned who consents to such operation and removal for the purpose of trans-
planting the -------------- into the body of----------------
organ or part to be removed name of recipient
Dated -....-------- Time --------- am* pm*------------------
witness
wife* husband* of ------------------------- witness
name of donor
*strike part not applicable
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this form is for a specific purpose. It should be noted that there is a
named donor into which the organ is to be transplanted. Thus the organ
cannot be implanted into an unspecified recipient. Nor can it be given
to any type of organ bank. The donor also must be living. Therefore
this particular consent form is not authorization to give up an organ at
death. The donor certifies that the procedure and consequences have
adequately been explained to him. The donor's spouse also signs the
form. Although this might seem unnecessary it would serve several pur-
poses. It would probably deter the spouse from bringing any civil action
against the doctor or the hospital in the event of a subsequent malfunction
in the donor and secondly it would indicate that the operation and conse-
quences thereof were adequately explained (that is, if the spouse under-
stood them).
Dr. Carl E. Wasmuth has drafted a suggested adult live donor form.2 '
This form differs in some respects from the one used at The Ohio State
University Hospital. Nothing is mentioned about the donor's age, and
the spouse is not required to sign. The witness, however, must state that
the donor understands the procedure, its risks, and consequences. The
agreement also neglects the donor's express understanding that without
the donated kidney the donee will probably die.
It must be pointed out that there are other factors which should be
considered as affecting a person's desire to become a donor. It has been
shown that volunteers in research volunteer at different rates according
to their sex, the severity of the discomfort involved, the socio-economic
level of the volunteer, their obligation to others (such as children and
spouse), family pressures, and the relationship to those to whom they
21 Permission to Remove Kidney for Transplantation
(Adult Live Donor Form)
Doctor --------------------------------- has explained to me that the life
of -----.-.------........-------------- is endangered due to irreversible
kidney disease. It has also been explained to me that a kidney can be transplanted
from one person to another by surgical operation. The immediate risks to me of the
operation for removal of my kidney, as well as the possible future permanent injury to
my health suffered as a direct result of the removal of my kidney has been fully ex-
plained to me. I am also aware of the possibility that such kidney transplant might
not be successful.
In an effort to benefit --------------------------------- , I nevertheless
wish and do request, authorize and direct Doctor-------------------
to remove one of my kidneys by means of surgical operation in order that this kidney
may be transplanted into ---------------------------
Date Signature of Donor
This is to certify that the above form was read and signed by the donor in my presence.
Further, it is my opinion that --------------- understands fully the
contemplated procedure, its risks and possible consequences.
Date Witness
The above form appeared in Washmuth & Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Huaan
Organ Transplantation, 14 CLEV.-MAIt. L REV. 442, 470 (1965).
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have obligations.2 Thus a physician should realize that informed con-
sent is not the only matter to be considered and should not allow people
to donate when he suspects that their social and economic positions might
not withstand a future loss which the death of the donor might produce.
To impose such an obligation on a physician places him in a very diffi-
cult position. He is not qualified to make such evaluations because his
education and clinical experience have not trained him to do so.
The lawyer has a responsibility to fulfill in this area. Legislation
could be enacted to promote a social worker-type investigation into each
donor's background. This social worker would investigate, report back
to the surgeon who is to perform the transplant and recommend allowing
the person to donate or not. There could be a presumption in favor of
donating and the surgeon would be morally bound to follow the recom-
mendations in the social worker's report. Such a presumption should be
contained in the state statutes. An alternative might be a legislative re-
quirement that the social worker's findings and recommendations be com-
municated to the donor so that a truly informed consent would be given.
The social worker need not be a genuine antagonist to the surgeon
and the hospital as long as he (or she) is a professional in the field as a
result of training at a university and a degree in social work. Having re-
ceived this training the social worker could be employed by the hospital
and still be effective in the position.
B. Live Minors as Donors
Just as there are problems with adults as donors for organ trans-
plants, even greater problems exist when a minor is the donor. The con-
sent of the parents of a minor must be obtained before a minor may be
operated on. There must also be some benefit to the minor.23 In the dis-
cussion about live adult donors it was pointed out that finding that a sur-
gical removal of a kidney has benefited the donor is almost impossible.
Indeed the opposite is generally the case in that the donor is placed in
a position of risk for the remainder of his life. Although an adult may
consent to such an operation, a parent may not consent to such a non-
beneficial operation on his child.
This problem arose in 1957 in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts in a case involving identical twins. Maggie Masden and her
nineteen year old twin sons, Leon and Leonard, were the plaintiffs in a
declaratory judgment action against surgeons on the staff of the Peter
Bent Brigham Hospital in Boston, Massachusetts. Leon was suffering
from chronic glomerulonephitis, a fatal kidney disease from which he
22 Martin, Arnold, Zimmerman, and Richart, Human Subjects in Clinical Research, 279
NEw ENG. J. Mmicntm 1426 (1968).
23 Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D. C. Cir. 1941).
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would die without transplantation. Leonard, on the other hand, was in
perfect health. After diagnosis at the Brigham Hospital the defendants
agreed to perform a kidney transplant operation and the three Masdens
(the father had previously deserted the family) who had come to Boston
solely for purposes of the transplant, gave their consent to such an opera-
tion. The surgeons and the Hospital acting on the advice of counsel
that they might be subject to civil liability and criminal prosecution de-
cided not to proceed with the transplant. Thereupon plaintiffs filed
their declaratory judgment action.24
Apparently the hospital and surgeons were worried about the lack of
benefit to the minor donor. Therefore they produced the testimony of a
psychiatrist whose statements led the court to conclude that:
if this operation is not performed and Leon dies in his opinion [the psy-
chiatrist's] a grave emotional impact on Leonard would result. This
would be further aggravated by a realization that it was within his power
to have saved the life of his brother had this operation been performed.2
The court also found
Leonard has been fully informed and understands the nature of the oper-
ation and its possible consequences. 26
The court then ruled
... as a matter of law that it is proper for the defendants with the assist-
ance of ...Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, its agents and servants, to
perform the operation herein described with the consent of all the plain-
tiffs without incurring any civil liability to Leonard or any criminal pro-
secution.27
This case was decided on June 12, 1957. On August 30, 1957, and No-
vember 20, 1957, in almost identical cases the same result was handed
down by this same Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. The cases of
Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666 Eq. and Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674
Eq. were declaratory judgment actions dealing with the transplantation
of kidneys in fourteen-year-old twins. In both cases Masden was cited
as controlling and in both cases identical results were handed down
even though different judges were sitting in each action. These appear
to be the only cases, both legal and medical, involving minors as organ
donors. Therefore it is important that they be analyzed in order to de-
termine how they relate to twin and non-twin donors and what their ef-
fect will be on the doctor who is confronted with the legal dilemma of
the minor donor.
2 4 Masen v. Harrison, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, No. 68651, June 12, 1957.
25 Id. at 2.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 4.
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The testimony of the psychiatrist does not appear to be as convincing
as the court seemed to think it was. There are several reasons for this.
It was stated that "a grave emotional impact would result". This in it-
self does not appear to be a very profound conclusion as it is one that
almost anybody-especially the judge-could arrive at with a little
thought.2 8 Yet the whole opinion of the court is based on this one opin-
ion which leaves the door open for almost all donors to donate since any
child of normal intelligence would suffer grave and emotional impact if his
mother, father, brother or sister died and a donation of one of his organs
would have saved this relative's life. And since a child would generally
be a good donor for such a relative (because of the genetic similarity)
there would seem to be no limitations upon this doctrine.
In addition performing the kidney operation under this theory still
does not benefit the child in the same way that other surgical procedures
may. It only serves to prevent his suffering a predicted grave emotional
impact, instead of correcting or repairing a defect. In a jurisdiction where
the minor was not allowed to donate, this grave emotional impact might
not result because the minor could legally do nothing to save his twin.
The court talks in somewhat confusing terms when it is considered
that a seven-year-old child could become a donor under this psychiatric
test. This view is softened somewhat by the court's finding that Leonard
understands the operation and the possible risks and consequences thereof.
In the Masden case the twins are nineteen-years-old. This is an age at
which a youth can very easily understand the consequences and risks in-
herent in such an operation. But the Huskey and Foster twins were only
fourteen-years-old. Yet the court decided that they were fully informed
and consented to the operation with a thorough understanding of the con-
sequences and attendant risks. This is incredible. It is almost beyond
belief to think that a fourteen-year-old child could have the ability to
understand such a problem, no matter how well the physician might have
attempted to explain the risks to him. Thus, it appears that the Alasden
test, which theoretically would have allowed a minor to donate only where
there was an informed consent by one capable of understanding the risks
and consequences of the nephrectomy and where there was psychiatric
testimony as to the prevention of emotional impact on the healthy twin, has
degenerated into a test involving only psychiatric testimony which itself
is nothing more than a common sense opinion by one who can conceive
of the closeness of family ties. This test appears to be unsound. This
viewpoint is reinforced by the fact that there have been no other reported
cases where minors have actually served as the donor. Doctors themselves
are reluctant to use minor donors because the risk of civil action by the
28 Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv.
891,894 (1959).
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donor upon reaching his majority and the attendant bad publicity which
might hurt his professional status. A careful inspection of this "grave
impact" test leads to one further conclusion. A child in his early teens is
very susceptible to family pressures-even those indirectly asserted. Thus,
in a situation where the child was the only possible donor the child would
be forced by family pressure into a situation where "grave emotional im-
pact" would result if he did not donate; but no such impact would result
if it were legally impossible for the child to donate because of his age
because there would be no reason for family pressure to be exerted.
These three cases leave several key issues unanswered. The Massa-
chusetts court talks of informed consent on the part of the donating
twin; but is this really necessary? Should a twin refuse to give his con-
sent, is parental consent enough if a benefit can be shown to accrue to
the donor twin? Is it enough if there is no more benefit than that
demonstrated by the psychiatric testimony in Masden? Suppose the twins
consent but the parents do not? These hypothetical questions point
out legal difficulties which were not discussed in .Masden or any other
known case. Although these questions have not as yet arisen, with the
ever increasing frequency of transplant operations and the desirability of
performing them on youths they are certain to arise.
There are several reasons for the expanding opportunities for organ
transplantation in youths. The first is sheer numbers. It is generally
considered that within the next decade over one-half of the world's pop-
ulation will be under twenty-five. This means that a great deal of this
percentage of this population will be under twenty-one. Second, young
people are usually better able to withstand surgical procedures involved
in organ transplantation and to fight off infections which set in as a re-
sult of the lowered body resistance caused by the ALG procedure for
suppressing the rejection process.
In this area the physician is faced with a dilemma. Legally, he is pre-
vented from using a minor as a donor. Medically, he realizes that the
minor is better able to withstand the surgery than his older counterpart.
A hypothetical situation illustrates the dilemma. A young man suffers
from chronic uremia and will die without a transplant. Histocompat-
ability tests show two possible donors: the patient's nineteen-year-old sister
and his forty-nine year old mother. The mother would like to donate
but because of her age and commitment to other children in the family
feels that she just cannot do it. The nineteen-year-old sister, an honor
student at a large midwestern university, fully understands the risks in-
volved and desires to donate one of her kidneys. But the doctor refuses to
allow her to donate on the basis of the above mentioned Masden case.
He feels that it is not worth the risk to his professional standing and med-
ical career should he subsequently be sued in an action for battery. In
1970]
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the light of the uncertainty of today's law the doctor is certainly justified
in taking his position. After all, he has other patients who would suffer
from a lack of his services if his license to practice is revoked. The prob-
lem is obvious, but what is the solution?
Legislation seems to be one solution. A law enabling eighteen year
old persons to donate their organs should receive approval from both the
medical and legal professions. Persons under eighteen would not be
allowed to donate for any reason. At the age of eighteen a normal per-
son is fully capable of understanding the risks inherent in a transplant
procedure. He is also mature enough to make up his own mind without
being pressured into it by family ties. Even the law recognizes this by
the fact that in many states people make wills at the age of eighteen and
in some states may even vote at eighteen.
By refusing to allow persons below the age of eighteen to donate, the
occasion for pressure and uninformed consent is eliminated in those in-
stances where it most often could exist. Also, by placing a definitive
restrictive age on donation the medical profession can more clearly evalu-
ate the possible range of donors and advise the patient.
The dangers in donating an organ are generally minimal. However,
there are definite dangers and the minor should not be allowed to donate
until he is fully able to comprehend the dangers or some benefit accrues
to him as a result of the donation.
C. Prisoners as Donors
Prisoners represent a unique possibility for organ supply in tissue
transplantation. In the past prisoners have often been used as guinea
pigs in medical research. However, it was not until the transplantation
"explosion" that the medical and legal professions took note of the tre-
mendous moral and legal problems involved. There are estimates that as
many as twenty thousand Federal prisoners are participating as volunteers
in medical experiments.29 Prison populations present an ideal group of
subjects because of their controlled environment. "As the convicts have
almost identical diets, sleeping hours and daily routine, they provide a
most convenient set of subjects for controlled clinical trials." 30
Cancer studies have been undertaken at the Ohio State Penitentiary
under the surveillance of the College of Medicine of the Ohio State Uni-
versity; 31 leukemia experiments have been conducted at the Cook County
Jail in Chicago 2 and new drug experiments at the Oklahoma State Peni-
2 9 
FOX, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEucs, 423, 425 (1960).
3
0 PAPPWORTH, HUMAN GUINEA PIGS 67 (1967).
31 DONNELLY, GOLDSTEIN, AND SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW: PROBLEMS FOR DECISION
IN THE PROMULGATION, INVOCATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF A LAW OF CRIMES, 79
(1962) [Hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL LAW].
3 2 Time Magazine, July 12, 1963, at 72.
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tentiary. 33 The same considerations that have promoted experimentation
on penal inmates in the past continue to operate and will promote trans-
plantation on them in the future. The July 12, 1963, issue of Time maga-
zine cited the following transplantation case:
An inmate of the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman who was
serving a life sentence for murder developed cancer of the lung. He was
transferred to the University Medical Center at Jackson. His diseased
lung was removed and he received the transplant of the lung of a pa-
tient who had recently died from a heart attack. The operation was not
successful and the man died two weeks later.34
In a series of procedures performed in Denver, Colorado, penal donors
from three prisons were used in kidney transplants.2 5 In this same series
of operations the donors were also involved in a study of their motives for
donating, the results of which will be discussed below.
As with the donors discussed previously, a freely given informed con-
sent by the donor is often difficult to obtain and creates most of the legal
problems in this area. At the present time the consent problem has not
been dealt with as it directly pertains to organ donors. However, those
medical personnel working with prisoners have generally attempted to
get a valid, willing consent.
Generally those performing the experiment have indicated a desire to
have a donor who is well informed as to the merits of the experiment as
well as its risks and yet has not been coerced into his decision. There are
two possibilities for coercion in this type of situation: (1) the prisoner
could be deprived of certain privileges or punished for not volunteering
or for refusing to continue to volunteer after he had once subjected him-
self to the whims of the medical researcher; (2) the medical researcher
could offer rewards which would be excessive and therefore subject the
prisoner to undue influence.
The first problem has been handled uniformly but the second has
never really been solved. In 1948, Governor Green of Illinois set up a
commission to report on the use of prison inmates as subjects for medical
experiments. Among this committee's reports were the following recom-
mendations on "ethical principles":
(1) All the subjects should be volunteers. Volunteering exists when a
person is able to say "yes" or "no" without fear of being punished
or of being deprived of privileges due him in the ordinary course
of events.
(2) Before volunteering the prisoner must be adequately informed of
any hazards that might exist in the experiment.
33 ld.
341d.
3 5 ETHIcs IN MEDrCAL PRoGREss: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TRANSPLANTATION,
75 (G. Wolstenholme & AL O'Conner ed. 1966) [Hereinafter cited as MEDICAL ETMICS].
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(3) The choice of volunteers must be made on the basis of established
criteria.3 6
In addition to these so-called "ethical principles" the Green committee
also considered financial and time-off rewards for participation in experi-
ments.
The reduction of sentence in prison under the parole system is viewed as
a reward for good conduct. Service as a subject in a medical experiment
is considered to be a form of good conduct.
A reduction of sentence in prison, if excessive or drastic, can amount to
undue influence. If the sole motive of the prisoner is to contribute to
human welfare, any reduction in sentence would be a reward. If the
sole motive of the prisoner is to obtain a reduction in sentence, an exces-
sive reduction of sentence would exercise undue influence in obtaining
the consent of prisoners to serve as subjects would be inconsistent with
the principle of voluntary participation.3 7
These opinions and recommendations sound nice but they do not answer
the basic questions: should monetary rewards or time-off rewards be
given? If so, how should the amount of money or time-off be computed?
In the cancer study at the Ohio State Penitentiary it was made explicit
that there would be no rewards given and no money paid to the prison
inmates for volunteering. An article appeared in the Ohio Penitentiary
News entitled "Volunteers Needed for Seventh Phase of Cancer Re-
search"3 8 in which it was explained that six previous steps in a cancer re-
search program had been conducted at the institution and that volunteers
were needed for the seventh phase of the experiment which was being
sponsored by the Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research of New
York City. Doctor Charles A. Doan, Dean of the College of Medicine of
the Ohio State University participated in the experiment. The article fur-
ther stated:
Your warden [Alvis] approved and allowed the research to be conducted
here only when he was well satisfied that this particular research was vi-
tal; would result in important information; and would not result in any
particular harm to the men who would ultimately volunteer.3 9
The article then continued to explain the procedures involved in the experi-
ment, the purposes, and the duration of time for which a volunteer must
sign up.
A prisoner's release form was included in the article and has been set
386 Green Committee, Ethics Governing the Service of Prisoners as Subjects in Medical Ex-
periments, 136 J.A.M.A. 457, 458 (1948).
3 7 Id.
38 Ohio Penitentiary News, LXVI, Jan. 3, 1959, at 1, col. 1, as quoted in CRUlIIAL LAW,
at 79.
39 Id., at 80.
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out in a footnote.4  This form contains several unique features. First,
the experiment is carefully explained to the person signing the statement
of consent. Second, there is no mention of any type of remuneration, i.e.,
either payment, time-off for good behavior or privileges. This form dif-
fers from an analagous form used at the Stateville Penitentiary which was
used to describe the experiment.4
40 Prisoner's Release Form
(Date)
Gentlemen:
, -------------------------- , of the Ohio Penitentiary, #.......
and being of the age of 21 years or more, hereby volunteer myself freely and of my
own will as a subject for experimentation in connection with a study of cancer, to be
carried out under the joint supervision of the Division of Medical Research of the Col-
lege of Medicine, The Ohio State University, and the Sloan-Kettering Institute of New
York City.
This study, as it has been explained to me, is intended to determine whether or not
presumedly killed cancer cells can be successfully used to immunize against living can-
cer cells. I have been told that the cancer cells will be transplanted to my body by
means of direct needle injection under my skin. I further understand that if the sub-
sequent cancer transplant is successful that its existence will be observed for an indefi-
nite period (whether I am still an inmate of the Ohio Penitenitary or nor, or am
transferred to one of its branches). Further, I will readily agree to submit to a surgical
excision of the involved area at any time or to a biopsy of adjacent (nearby) areas of
my body upon the request of the principal investigators, Doctors Charles A. Doan,
Alice E. Moore, and Chester M. Southam, or their associates. It is expected that if the
transplant survives that the entire growth will be removed. From time to time a
sample of my blood will be drawn for analysis during this study.
I also hereby agree that I will not donate any of my blood to the American Red
Cross for transfusion until a release for same is obtained.
(Signed)...........................
Witness
(Name)
(Address)
Witness
(Name)
(Address)
The organizations involved in this study agree to pay for any and all medical care,
special treatment, biopsies, etc., that may be necessary in connection with this study.
411 . . ., No.... aged . . ., hereby declare that I have read and clearly understood the
above notice, as testified by my signature hereon, and I hereby apply to the University
of Chicago, which is at present engaged on malarial research at the orders of the Gov-
ernment, for participation in the investigations of the life-cycle of the malarial para-
site. I hereby accept all risks connected with the experiment and on behalf of my
heirs and my personal and legal representatives I hereby absolve from such liability
the University of Chicago and all the technicians and assistants taking part in the
above-mentioned investigations. I similarly absolve the Government of the State of
Illinois, the Director of the Department of Public Security of the State of Illinois, the
warden of the State Penitentiary at Joliet-Stateville and all employees of the above in-
stitutions and Departments, from all responsibility, as well as from all claims and pro-
ceedings or Equity pleas, for any injury or malady, fatal or otherwise, which may ensue
from these experiments.
I hereby certify that this offer is made voluntarily and without compulsion. I
have been instructed that if any offer is accepted I shall be entitled to remuneration
amounting to... dollars, payable as provided in the above Notice.
This form appeared in PAPPwORT-r, HumAN GunMA PIGs, 62 (1967).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In a letter from Charles A. Doan, M.D. to J. Goldstein, dated January
15, 1959, the procedure was explained as well as the fact that there was no
coercion and no pressure of any kind.
. . . [A] copy of the release form . .. is signed in duplicate and with
two guard witnesses. Dr. Southam from the Sloan-Kettering Institute
for cancer research, Dr. Brooks, the prison physician and I meet with each
new group and explain in detail the objectives of the research and the
things that will be done in order to accomplish the necessary observations
over a given period of time ... the blood samples, the innoculations and
the biopsies are explained in detail-any and all questions are answered
and any individual who wishes to withdraw from the experiment is given
ample opportunity and is urged to do so if he has any reservation at all.
Practically all of these men have dose relatives who have been or are
sufferers from cancer, and have individually expressed themselves as
more than willing to try and advance our knowledge of cancer through
participation in this program. Absolutely no coercion or pressure of any
kind is used, and there are no special privileges granted to these men be-
cause they participate in this program. They continue to be ambulatory
and do their regular prison jobs throughout the entire experiment.42
In the Denver prison where the penal inmates volunteer their kidneys for
transplantation no pay was involved and there was no reduction in sen-
tence. As an indication that there was no coercion, only a little more
than two percent (100 out of 4,000) of the prisoners volunteered.4 3
In the case of the cancer experiment at the Ohio Penitentiary the in-
tention of the doctors and the Sloan-Kettering Research Institute is admir-
able but somewhat unrealistic. By stating that no privileves were granted
the Dean is attempting to prove that there was no element of coercion or
pressure in the method of obtaining consent. A little reflection on this
matter leads to a contrary conclusion. Most prison inmates will eventu-
ally be released from prison on parole or when their sentence has been
served. Their complete record is considered whenever a hearing comes
up as to whether parole should be granted or not. One of the prime con-
siderations is good conduct. Even without stating that a prisoner would
get time off for voluntary subjection to medical experiments this is one
phase of good conduct and will be considered. Thus there is an element
of coercion present. The prisoner generally knows how the parole system
works and what factors are considered. But how does this affect the pris-
oner, and is it good or bad?
A prisoner who donates an organ for humanitarian reasons such as
those suggested in Dean Doan's letter should definitely have this consid-
ered when he comes up for parole or is given time off for good behavior.
In this case it probably makes little difference if he is given advance in-
formation as to how volunteering will effect his sentence. He would
42 CRDMNAL LAw at 80.
43 MEDICAL ETHICS at 75.
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volunteer anyway. But the "hardened criminal" is another problem. He
may do anything to shorten his sentence. This prisoner uses the experi-
ment as a means to an end which is not desirable from the general pub-
lic's point of view.
The study conducted at the Harry S. Truman Laboratory, supra, also
delved into the problem of why convicts volunteer for experiments. The
results are somewhat surprising. In "Study No. I-Why Prisoners Vol-
unteer" the objective was "to determine why prisoners did or did not vol-
unteer as subjects in a search for new antimalarial drugs and the extent
to which they understood the element of risk involved. ' 4 4  Each inmate
was told he would get paid but could expect no reduction in his sentence.
Each physically fit volunteer was given an informed consent form to read
and sign. During the course of the experiment the risk involved (which
was almost non-existent) was continually explained to the volunteers.
After the conclusion of the experiment two groups were questioned.
Group number one was comprised of physically fit prisoners to whom
the experiment had been explained but who had decided not to volunteer.
Group number two was comprised of physically fit prisoners to whom
the experiment had been explained, who had volunteered for the experi-
ment and had thereafter received greater explanation of the experiment,
its purposes and attendent risks. The inmates who participated in the
project did not understand the disease or its risk any better than those
who had not participated, even though they had received detailed informa-
tion throughout the program. The volunteers also described the project in
terms of "high risk" even though the physicians explained that the risk
was minimal.
This study indicated that the prisoners did not first consider the risk
and information provided before volunteering. The risk was not even
considered. About half the participants gave "altruism" as the reason for
volunteering; the other half gave money as their reason. Nearly all the
non-volunteers believed it was an act of courage to volunteer.
The almost universal respect among nonvolunteers for those who did
volunteer may offer some clue to the other group's reasons for volunteer-
ing. Although society at large regards prison life as having low status
and few privileges, a system of privileges and status does operate within
the prison itself. In a county jail [as this was], however, the oppor-
tunities to assert ones superiority are few, and those that do exist are open
to a limited number of inmates. Projects like the malaria experiment
provide many with a real chance to demonstrate their importance, not
only to other inmates, but to the "square Johns", and it is possible that
this consideration takes precedence over the weighing of risk and benefit
implied by the informed-consent procedure.45
44 Martin, Arnold, Zimmerman, and Richart, Human Subjects in Clinical Research, NEW
ENG. J. MEDICIN 1427 (1968).
45 1d. at 1427-1428.
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It is noteworthy that there is no talk of parole or its consideration by the
prisoners. The reason is that all the prisoners contacted in this experi-
ment were serving sentences of 1 year or less and thus it was not a major
consideration.
This study and the previous comments lead up to the conclusion that
the "informed consent" rule is simply not an effective tool in the natu-
rally coercive atmosphere of a penal institution. Although it is true that
transplantation itself has not as yet reached the point where prisoners are
a major supply it is time to consider the problem. Transplantation has
brought many other problems to a place of prominence and is likely to do
so with penal donors.
The Denver experiment utilizing penal institution donors was subse-
quently discontinued when the transplantation committee at the Univer-
sity of Colorado decided "that the use of penal volunteers, however han-
dled in a local situation, would inevitably lead to abuse if accepted as a
reasonable precedent and applied broadly."48  It seems more than pos-
sible that the physicians involved were afraid that such conceivable abuse
might lead to repercussions affecting the whole field of transplants-a
phenomenon which the physicians definitely do not want.
The problems in this area are present and undoubtedly will continue.
As long as there are prisons with their ideal experimental and control
possibilities there will be physicians desirous of conducting experiments-
especially transplant procedures---on the inmates. Clearly in some cases
there is nothing wrong with this, in some instances. Lawyers should co-
operate with the medical personnel and institutional personnel to arrive
at a solution which prevents coercion and undue influence, yet allows the
willing donor to give his organs. There is no reason why prisoners could
not be paid for their time spent in experiments just as they are paid for
other work at the penitentiary. That is, they would receive the same rate
of pay. Thus there would be no monetary reasons coercing an inmate to
choose experimentation over any other type of work.
For that group of prisoners who are considered "hardened" and
should be kept in jail without time off for good conduct, the prison offi-
cials could simply not allow these men to volunteer. Then everybody
who did volunteer would have their volunteering considered to be just
one of the many factors to be considered in granting parole or time off
for good behavior. If a prisoner's intentions are good there is nothing
wrong with allowing him to "prove" to the parole board that he is a
worthwhile individual. Volunteering for medical experiments in the
form of donating kidneys is just one means of proving this.
4 6 MEDICAL ETHICS at 76-77.
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D. Necessary Donors
The fourth category of donor is that person who must give up an
organ in order to live. One example is the hydrocephalic child who must
give up one of his kidneys as a result of the surgical procedure involved.47
A second example is where a kidney is removed because of a disease in
the lower ureter or in the performance of a ureteric subarachnoid anas-
tomosis.4s In these situations the ordinary problems of kidney donation
are absent. The healthy kidney is simply a by-product of the life saving
procedure. Once it has been decided that a kidney must be removed the
surgeon looks around for a potential recipient. When a compatible re-
cipient has been found and the consent forms have been signed the re-
moval and transplantation into the recipient are performed.
E. Cadaveric Donors
The cadaveric donor presents many unique problems-several of
which may have been solved by the recent promulgation of the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act. A brief history into the common law of bodies is
necessary to fully comprehend several of the present day problems. Such
a background is the subject of a 1966 annotation:
Under the early English common law, no rights in property in a
dead body were recognized. From this it followed, quite logically, that
a dead body could not be the subject of a testamentary bequest, and a tes-
tator's directions for the disposal of his remains were merely a request
without probative effect.
Although the English rule that no rights of property existed in a
dead body was originally adopted in this country, courts recognized
quite early that although a corpse was not property in a commercial
sense, it possessed many of the attributes and was frequently described as
"quasi-property". Having recognized certain property rights in dead
bodies, many courts have announced the rule that a person has a right to
dispose of his own body by will. However, courts, while paying lip ser-
vice to the doctrine of testamentary disposal, have in certain instances
permitted the wishes of the decedent's spouse or next of kin to prevail
over those of the testator. In other instances courts have accepted and
acted upon evidence that indicated that the decedent's wishes concern-
ing the disposition of his body had changed since the execution of his
will. Courts have also ruled that because of lapse of time, or some prior
disposition of the decedent's remains, the performance of the testator's
wishes had become impossible of performance.
In the absence of specific statutory authority, a person has, at best, a
very qualified assurance that the testamentary disposition that he makes
of his own body will be fulfilled. This appears particularly true if his
will provides for disposition by some means other than interment. And
47 Moom at 61.
4
sCALE, RENAL TRANSPLANTATION, 149 (1967).
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the chances against fulfillment become vastly greater if he desires to
donate his body, or parts thereof, for scientific or medical purposes.49
In the past few years legislatures, who began to realize the lag inherent
in their field, have begun to do something about it. What exactly is the
problem with which they are faced?
Individuals generally die from a combination of causes. But it is certain
that at the instant of death, certain organs are still functioning and ca-
pable of doing so for some time in the future. Therefore, it is possible for
these organs to be a source for use in tissue transplantation. The problem
of cause is consent-whose? In the past the consent of the deceased
would not have been enough. That is, even though the deceased gave
consent, the next of kin might decide that he or she did want any part
of the body of the deceased removed; and thus there were no organs to be
transplanted. The reasons for this are fairly obvious. If the state was
one in which the decedent's testamentary disposition was not effective be-
cause of the common law rule then there was simply no way to get around
the refusal of the next of kin. But what about those states giving re-
spect to the wishes of the dead? Here two factors must be considered.
Although the doctor or potential recipient can go to court and get the
organ(s), in so delicate an area as transplantation the medical profession
simply does not want to create a public spectacle. It looks bad and will
greatly hinder the success in obtaining future donors. Secondly, if any
time goes by at all, as explained previously, the organ will have lost its
viability and could not possibly be successfully transplanted.
Some states realized this problem and began to enact statutory au-
thority for the donation of bodies or organs to specific individuals, medi-
cal schools, hospitals, and doctors. Thirty-nine states and the District
of Columbia have general donation statutes while four more states au-
thorize the gift of eyes only.15 Each of these statutes is different as to
permissible donors, means of donation, revocation, number of witnesses
and age of the donor. Ohio has a fairly comprehensive statute.,"  The
4 9 Annot, 7 A.L.R.3d 747, 748-49 (1968). See also WASMuTH, LAw FOR THE PHYSICIAN,
453 (1966), Comment, The Law of Dead Bodies: Impeding Medical Progress, 19 OHIO ST. L.J.
455 (1958); 45 CHI-KENT L REV. 78, 80 (1968).
50 UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr at 5. The states are as follows: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. Georgia, Maine, New Jersey
and South Carolina authorize gifts of eyes only.
5 1 OHo REV. CODE ANN. ch. 2108.01 (Page, 1953):
§ 2108.01 Instrument of gift of body; rights of next of kin and donee.
A person who is twenty-one years of age or older and of sound mind may make a
gift of all or any part of his body effective upon his death, by a written instrument
signed by him or by some person in his presence and at his express direction and sub-
scribed by two witnesses in the presence of the donor and each other who shall have no
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provisions are somewhat progressive in comparison to the acts of other
states and agree to a large extent with the provisions of the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act which will be discussed below. It also has many of
the same defects.
Problems have developed because of the fact that people in this coun-
try move from state to state. Since the requirements for making dona-
tions are different in each state the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws at its July, 1968, meeting, drafted the Uni-
form Anatomical Gift Act and approved and recommended it for enact-
ment in all the states.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act is limited to ante-mortem gifts. It
does not cover the present day problem of inter-vivos gifts, such as kid-
neys from a living donor to his sister. A summary of the act follows:
(1) The gift may be made by a person of eighteen years or older
during his lifetime to take effect upon his death. If the decedent has
not made such a gift it may be made by his relatives, next of kin or guard-
ian according to a stated order of priority. But the donee may not accept
affiliation with the donee or the donee institution. Such a gift made in a written in-
strument is effective without delivery or acceptance and may be revoked in the same
manner as executed. If the entire body has ben donated; next of kin may arrange
funeral services or other last rites before the body is claimed by the donee.
The rights of a donee or his agent under such a gift are superior to those of any
person claiming as spouse, relative, guardian, or in any other relationship, as such
rights may be limited by the instrument of donation.
A gift made under this section, in addition to the authorizations contained in the
instrument of gift, authorizes the donee or his agent to perform only the surgical pro-
cedure necessary to carry out the gift. A donee may employ or authorize any licensed
physician or surgeon to carry out necessary surgical procedures. When the gift is of
only a part or parts of the body, immediately following the removal of the part or parts
named, custody of the body, shall be transferred to the next of kin.
§ 2108.02 Authorized donees.
The following persons may be named as donee in a gift made under section
2103.01 of the Revised Code for the purposes indicated:
(A) A licensed physician or surgeon, or a hospital, for medical education, re-
search, the advancement of medical science, aid in therapy, or for transplantation to
replace diseased or deteriorated parts of other persons;
(B) A medical school, college, or university engaged in medical education and
research, for its educational research or scientific purposes;
(C) A non-profit blood bank, artery bank, eye bank, or other storage facility for
human parts to be used for therapy or transplantation for other persons, or for medical
education and research;
(D) A named individual for transplantation or therapy needed by him;
(E) Any licensed physician or surgeon claiming the body, not naming him, for
any of the above purposes
If the donor so provides in the instrument of donation, in the event transplantation
to a named donee is not feasible, removal for transplantation may be made for any
person by a licensed physician or surgeon, who is the alternate donee for such purpose.
§ 2108.03 Liability for damages.
A person who, in good faith and acting in reliance upon an authorization made
under Chapter 2108. of the Revised Code and without notice of revocation thereof,
takes possession of, performs surgical operations upon, or removes tissue, substances,
or parts from a human body, or who refuses such a gift, or any person who unknow-
ingly fails to carry out the wishes of the donor according to Chapter 2108. of the Re-
vised Code, is not liable for damages in a civil action brought against him for such act.
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the gift if he knows that the deceased or someone of higher priority than
the one giving permission would have opposed such a gift.
(2) Any hospital, surgeon, physician, teaching institution, organ stor-
age bank or specified individual may be the donee as long as the purpose
of the gift is for medical or dental education, research, advancement of
medical or dental science, therapy or transplantation.
(3) An anatomical gift may be executed by a will which becomes
effective upon the death of the donor without waiting for probate and
which is valid and effective if acted upon in good faith even though sub-
sequently declared invalid for testamentary purposes. Any document
may be used to make the gift as long as it is signed by the donor in the
presence of two witnesses who sign the document in his presence. The
act specifically allows a credit card type of card to be used to make a gift
as long as it is signed as above. If the gift is not made to a specified
donee the attending physician may accept the gift as the donee but he may
not participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a part un-
less he is so indicated in the document creating the gift.
(4) Delivery of the document creating the gift is not necessary but
the Act provides that delivery of such document may be made to expedite
the appropriate procedures after death.
(5) The Act provides that if delivery of a document has been made
to a donee the donor may amend or revoke such gift by a statement-
either oral or in writing-communicated to the donee or a signed card or
document found on his person or in his effects. Any undelivered docu-
ment of gift may be revoked in the above manner or by destruction,
cancellation or mutilation of the document and any copies thereof. Gifts
made by will may be amended or revoked in the manner provided for
under state law for the amendment or revocation of wills or in the same
manner as for delivered documents.
(6) The donee may accept or reject the gift. If he accepts he may use
those parts given to him and then custody vests in that person(s) under
obligation to dispose of the body. The time of death is determined by
the attending physician and anyone acting in good faith under the terms
of the act is neither liable in a civil act for damages nor is he subject to
criminal prosecution.
There are several aspects of transplantation with which the act does not
deal.5 2 The Act has made no attempt to define the time of death. A
comment to the Act specifically refers to this matter:
no attempt is made to define the uncertain point in time when life ter-
minates. This point is not subject to dear cut definition and medical
authorities are currently working toward a consensus on the matter. Mod-
em methods of cardiac pacing, artificial respiration, artificial blood cir-
52 Stason, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 23 Bus LAw. 919, 927-929 (1968).
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culation and cardiac stimulation can continue certain bodily systems and
metabolism far beyond spontaneous limits. The real question is when
have irreversible changes taken place that preclude return to normal brain
activity and self sustaining bodily functions. No reasonable statutory
definition is possible. The answer depends upon many variables, differ-
ing from case to case. Reliance must be placed upon the judgment of
the physician in attendance. The Uniform Act so provides.53
This is a serious omission and will be dealt with later. The Act also omits
reference to payment for the gifts. At first glance it seems that payment
for gifts offends the dignity of death which goes with such a gift. Yet
if kept within control there is no reason why payment should not be re-
ceived as it is often given for blood. But this is not to say that problems
may not develop. A brief inquiry leads to the situation where the dying
person's next of kin is approached about selling organs and is offered a
high price. An unscrupulous next of kin may feel that the dying person
does not want his organs donated but feels there is no danger of it hap-
pening and so says nothing. Thus there is a potential problem which
should have been dealt with. It will certainly develop as transplants of
all kinds become more prevalent. The answer is not simple and the legis-
lation will be difficult to draft-but it should be attempted.
No provision is made for establishing who is to receive the donated
organs in a situation where a specific donee is not specified. That is, who
gets the organ when a hospital or physician is the donee? Can the organ
then be implanted into anyone? The problem has thus been left to the
doctor to decide. At the present time, when transplantation is still in its
youth, this is permissible because the doctor generally does not have a
great number of recipients to choose among. That is, a given donor is
generally histologically compatible with a small number of possible do-
nees. But as transplantation skills increase, it may become a problem
and doctors will definitely need standards that enable them to choose the
proper donor. This could have been provided for and will be discussed
later.
The definition of death problem mentioned above has come to the
forefront with the successful performance of the heart transplant, al-
though it exists every time any organ is removed from a cadaver and
transplanted into a waiting recipient. The problem is simple but the
solution is complex.
Briefly stated the problem is all a matter of time. As previously
stated organs lose their viability a short time after death. Thus the suc-
cessful performance of any transplant requires that the organ be removed
as soon as possible after death in order that the transplant succeed. Until
recently the layman, lawyer and physician determined death by the same
criterion. This was the so-called "clinical-death" which resulted when
5 UNwORM ANATOMICAL GIFT Acr at 19-20.
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there was a cessation of the heart beat and breathing had stopped (often
shown by holding a mirror close to the deceased's mouth to see if it
clouded up by breath)." But these criterion are no longer definitive of
death in the large university or leading hospital where miracle machines
and techniques are used to maintain body functions. The heart-lung
machine is capable of pumping blood through the circulatory system
while oxygenating it at the same time. To aid a weak erratic heart which
has all the tissues intact, the electronic pacemaker has been developed to
stimulate the heart by means of electrical impulses so that it beats at a
predetermined rate. Respirators are a common means of aiding a pa-
tient to breathe when he cannot otherwise breathe by himself. Thus the
medical profession has succeeded in maintaining heart beat and breathing
and thus destroying the indicators of clinical death. Originally these
machines were developed to provide temporary relief from certain prob-
lems but have instead become a means of prolonging life when in fact
no meaningful life is possible.
Generally medical personnel have come to agree that meaningful life
is no longer possible when there is no possibility that the brain will con-
tinue to function. That is, if the brain continues to function with the
respirator and heart-lung machine hooked up there is life, but otherwise
there is none. The concept of death is important outside the scope of
transplantation.
Many people are now maintained in a sort of twilight state by the use
of machines which do the work of their lungs or their heart while they
are completely unconscious. Many of these people will never resume an
independent existence away from the machines, but they can't stay on the
machine for ever and ever. There just aren't the machines and there isn't
a place to park these people. One has to decide therefore when to switch
off the machines, and this question arises quite independently of con-
siderations about transplants.55
Thus there are a great many considerations to be kept in mind in trans-
plant and nontransplant situations in determining death.
The problem of informed consent is certainly important in this area.
A person may not want to donate organs during his lifetime but may be
more than happy to do so at his death. But when he consents he may
want some assurance that he will really be dead. What can the doctor
tell him? What can the doctor do to assure the next of kin that the pro-
posed donor is really dead? The problem is that miracle recoveries do
exist and are in the back of every donor's mind (or his next of kin's
mind).
In the summer of 1967 U.S. Infantryman, Specialist 4th Class Jacky
54 N. Y. Times, May 19, 1968, at 78.
55MI cAL ETHICS at 71.
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C. Bayne "died" from wounds suffered in Viet Nam. For 45 minutes
doctors had applied external cardiac massage and artificial respiration
until his electrocardiograph showed no heart activity. A few hours later,
as the embalmer was preparing to inject embalming fluid a flicker of
pulse was discovered. He was rushed back to the hospital where he was
revived. He is now back in the United States, receiving rehabilitation
treatment." The Soviet physicist Lev Davidovich Landan was gravely in-
jured in an auto accident in March, 1962. Four days after the accident his
heart stopped beating and his arterial blood pressure dropped to zero.
Clinically he was dead. The doctors revived the heart with injections of
adrenaline, strophanthin and blood injections. Landan's heart stopped
three more times during the next week and each time the doctors brought
him back. After lying in a coma for sixty days he regained conscious-
ness and his memory and power of speech. By December, 1962, he had
recovered enough to receive the Nobel Prize in physics.57  With these
sensational recoveries brought to the public's attention through sensa-
tional newspaper reports, several problems develop. First, a donor (or
his next of kin) may develop the idea that these extraordinary life saving
techniques will not be used to keep him alive if the organs of his body
are to be donated. Second, in a situation where life has already ceased to
exist the doctor, in order to avoid civil liability may feel compelled to use
extraordinary life saving techniques, at a great cost to everyone, when the
need for such techniques has long since passed. The solution to this
problem is difficult and yet the mechanics are simple.
A statutory definition of death may be impossible. But there are
other ways to meet the problem. Standards for determining death are
possible and should be enacted by the legislatures to implement the cri-
teria set up by the medical profession. A few suggested criteria are set
out below.
A. Death is the final and irreversible cessation of perceptible heartbeat
and respiration. Conversely, as long as any heartbeat or respiration
can be perceived, either with or without mechanical or electrical
aids, and regardless of how the heartbeat and respiration were main-
tained, death has not occurred. [Emphasis in the original.]
The measurement of brain activity is presently possible in only those
isolated cases where death occurs in the operating room or on the
examination table. For this reason, the use of these phenomena as
a guidepost has been purposely excluded from the definition.5s
B. Death is an irreversible cessation of all of the following:
(1) Total cerebral function, (2) spontaneous function of the re-
spiratory system, (3) spontaneous function of the circulatory system.
Special circumstances may, however, justify the pronouncement of
56N. Y. Times, April 21, 1968, at 119.
57id.
583 HOUTS, & HAUT, COURT ROOM MEDICINB, § 1.03(4) (1968).
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death when consultations consistent with established professional
standards have been obtained and when valid consent to withhold
or stop resuscitative measures have been given by the appropriate
relatives or legal guardian. 59
C. Human life continues for as long as its vital functions, distinguished
from the simple life of the organs, manifest themselves without the
help of artificial process. 60
D. The Neurology Department of the Southwestern Medical School at
Dallas, The University of Texas submitted the following criteria for
complete cerebral death in the presence of heart beat and relatively
normal blood pressure:
(1) There would be no electrical activity of the brain, as shown
by completely flat electroencephalograph lines, even with high
amplification. There would be no EEG response to pinch or
noise.
(2) There would be no spontaneous respiration. (In such cases the
respiration would be solely supported artifically.)
(3) There would be no reflexes of the pupils or tendon reflexes
and no pulse change from eyeball pressure.
(4) There would be no eye response to stimulation with 200 mil-
liliters of ice water in each ear-tested separately.
(5) That this state (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4) must persist unchanged
for at least two hours.
(6) All such patients must also have no evidence in blood samples
of toxic levels of central nervous system depressants such as
might be used in a suicide attempt.
On fulfillment of these standards, the neurologist, with the concur-
rence of one or more colleagues, would certify that the patient is
neurologically nonviable or has reached the point of cerebral death.
The neurologists would in no other way be involved in determining
the suitability of the donor, or in problems of care of either donor
or recipient.
Finally, it will be the policy of Southwestern that no transplant
will be done if there is any suspicion the donor was involved in
a homicide.61
E. On August 9, in Sydney, Australia, the World Medical Association
adopted a statement on death called the Declaration of Sydney. The
statement does not attempt to define death. It contains the follow-
ing statements:
The determination of the time of death is in most countries
the legal responsibility of the physician and should remain so.
Two modem practices in medicine, however, have made it nec-
essary to study the question of the time of death further: (1)
the ability to maintain by artificial means the circulation of ox-
ygenated blood through tissues of the body which may have
59 Halley, and Harvey, 204 J.A.M.A. 423 (1968).
60 Pope Pius XI1, Quoted in N. Y. Times, May 19, 1968, at 78.
61 Unpublished Report, Spectrum, A Report from the Dean, Southwestern Medical School,
Univ. of Texas, July 19, 1968.
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been irreversibly injured; and (2) the use of cadaver organs
such as hearts or kidneys for transplantation.
This determination will be based on clinical judgment supple-
mented if necessary by a number of diagnostic aids, of which
the electroencepholograph is currently the most helpful. How-
ever, no single technological criterion is entirely satisfactory in
the present state of medicine nor can anyone technological pro-
cedure be substituted for the overall judgment of the physician.
If transplantation of an organ is involved, the decision that
death exists should be made by two or more physicians and
the physicians determining the moment of death should in no
way be immediately concerned with the performance of the
transplantation.
Determination of the point of death of the person makes it
ethically permissible to .ease attempts at resuscitation and, in
countries where the law permits, to remove organs from ca-
davers .... 62
Inherent in these six definitions of death is the concept of complete cere-
bral death. In the first definition by Marshal Houts, which is the closest
to the clinical death definition, it is recognized that the environment at
the time of death is related to the problem. A man who dies at home in
his sleep and is not discovered for several days is niot important as a do-
nor. His organs have lost their viability. The person who dies in a hos-
pital is quite a different problem. Within minutes respirators and other
machines may be hooked up in order to preserve his organs for trans-
plantation. The problem is: How soon can death be recognized? At
what point can we safely say that the man has ceased to exist as a human
being and that his organs may be removed for transplantation? There
is no doubt that the physicians in charge are competent to determine when
a person is dead. The real problem is whether he may not "jump the
gun" in declaring somebody dead so that his organs will be more suitable
for implantation into a second individual. The criteria have been devel-
oped to prevent this from happening. But it does not seem possible to
legislate standards such as these for the reason that they cannot be en-
forced. Paul J. Matte, after discussing organ transplants and human ex-
perimentation went on to say that:
... organ transplants ... have introduced into a medical ethic... the
need to define in ethical and theological terms that point at which an in-
dividual can be considered truly dead, or at a minimum to have lost his
status as a human being. There is immediate need in these areas of med-
ical practice for the drawing of legal lines beyond which decisions in terms
of individual morality becomes permissible and relevant .... [Answers
to these problems require much more than attention to a minimal morality
of duty...
... [Flrom lawyers and physicians laboring at what has been called
62 WMA Code Defines Death, AMA News, August 26, 1968 at 3.
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the interface of medicine and law . . . are most likely to come pragmatic
solutions to these problems . ..[L]aw has incurred thereby an obliga-
tion which has at last come due, and a day has come when the law, as
guardian of such minimal public morality as may be, must devote more of
its time and talents to search for answers to questions where ...issues
are equivocal and precedents are silent. I do not believe the law will lack
competence in these matters. However, I do fear that without organized
pressure from the discipline of forensic science for a judicial, a contempla-
tive, an investigative, or even a committee approach to these problems,
the law of medical practice will again be plagued by ad hoc precedents
and emergency legislation hastily contrived in response to public pressure
and emotional reaction to particular medical calamity.63
Dr. Matte's point seems dear. If something is not done about this moral
matter by a concerned group of physicians and lawyers harmful results
may occur. One can imagine the parade of horribles that might result if
an important dignitary were to die because the plug was pulled too soon.
A rash of unnecessary legislation would result that would successfully pre-
vent any future transplantation. The lawyer as "the guardian of public
morality" is faced with a dilemma. On the one hand he must be sure that
the potential donor is protected from a premature death and also that the
physician is not accused of murder. On the other hand, transplantation
has been shown to be successful and he must not place any unduly severe
restrictions on it which would prevent a recipient from enjoying years of
productive life. This writer has no doubts that legislation will be forth-
coming, but it must serve these ends. The physicians would do well to
cooperate in its promulgation.
Legislation should not invade the medical province by imposing stand-
ards of death similar to those indicated above, but it can successfully
encourage the adoption of standards by hospitals, etc. The solution in-
volves the legislative adoption of a system of committees at each institu-
tion and a requirement that each committee set up its own standards which
would be available to anybody and amendable at the insistance of the
hospital staff. Adherence to these standards would absolve the medical
profession from civil liability except for negligence.
Several systems have been suggested. The Stanford Medical Center
has three committees of three members. One committee interviews the
donor and must agree unanimously that he is suitable before he sees the
surgeon. A second committee interviews the potential recipient and must
unanimously agree that he is a suitable recipient and that the chances of
success are good. Death is determined by a third committee whose mem-
bers are obligated to do everything for him before he is declared dead
and his organs are removed and distributed to waiting recipients. This
death-determining-team is not related in any way with the actual trans-
63 Matte, Law, Morals and Medicine: A Method of Approach to Current Problems, 13 J.
FoR. Sa. 318, 331-32 (1968).
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plant itself.0 4 This watchdog procedure of separation of treatment and
transplantation has generally been accepted by the medical profession.
There is little question but that it is unethical for a physician to treat both
the donor and [the] recipient. Only after the donor's physician has given
up hope and diagnosed the state of brain death can the transplant team
ethically act or otherwise intrude itself upon the scene.65
A second system involves a legislative enactment of a board of physicians
at each hospital who function to determine brain death. This could also
be a committee of three composed of an anesthesiologist, a neurologist
and a specialist in internal medicine. If one of these were not available
an outside physician from the particular specialty could be chosen by
members of the hospital staff. In non-emergency situations this commit-
tee would meet to determine by unanimous approval if a patient had suf-
fered cerebral death. If so, the treating physician would then be free to
discontinue treatment. Then the transplant surgeon, with the permission
of the treating physician would be free to remove whatever organs the
patient or his next of kin had agreed to. The legislation should provide
that the board's determination of cerebral death would be conclusive on
that subject in any civil litigation in the event that the treating physician
discontinued treatment and was subsequently sued in a wrongful death
action. This proposed system also concludes that if the physician refused
to discontinue treatment after a finding of cerebral death, a person liable
for the payment of medical fees would be able to resist payment of fees
for subsequent medical treatment.
Doctors generally appear to be against the use of committees in de-
ciding death. The reasoning is based on the fact that large committees
are generally not able to decide matters quickly. This matter of commit-
tees will be carefully considered in the section on recipients. However,
it is probably the case that most physicians would not be opposed to small
three man committees which could easily be convened and decide the mat-
ter on the basis of established criteria.
In the end the decision rests on the physician. Through years of train-
ing and experience he alone is qualified to determine when death has oc-
curred. Even if standards have been set up, he alone can interpret and
apply the facts to these criteria. The courts and legislatures should do no
more than force the physicians to adopt standards and to be consistent.
Such legislation would seem to be just what the doctors would want. By
promulgating and adhering to a set of rules determining death the physi-
cians associated with the transplant would have no civil liability to worry
041Te National Catholic Reporter, June 26, 1968, at 6.
65 Wasmuth, The Concept of Death, 30 OHIo ST. L.J. 32, 56 (1969).
66 Id.
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about. This in itself would be an advantage that the present system-if
there is one-does not offer.
F. Animal Donors
The sixth possible source of organs is the animal donor. This possi-
bility presents two major problems. First, the genetic difference between
man and animals is very great. Therefore the immune reaction is very
great and rejection of the tissue graft is extraordinary. Second, this type of
procedure is very offensive to the dignity of man and thus has not been
attempted as often as it perhaps should be. There have been no legal cases
on this, but there have been several attempts at transplantation.
On November 3, 1963, in New Orleans, Dr. Reemtsma and his col-
leagues, working under the direction of Dr. Oscar Creech of the Tulane
Medical School transplanted the kidneys from an 85 pound chimpanzee
into a 37 year old man. The patient had been suffering from chronic
glomerulonephritis and no cadaver was made available. The patient died
eight weeks after the transplant. During that time the chimpanzee kid-
neys worked quite well and received a good supply of blood. The patient
died as a result of the rejection mechanism. 67
This experiment was really quite amazing and opened the door for
future experiments. In 1964 Mississippi's Dr. James E. Hardy performed
the first transplant of a heart into a human patient using a chimpanzee as
the donor.6 8 Dr. Charles Hufuagel of the Georgetown University Medi-
cal School plans to expose the human-sized hearts of unborn calves to
radiation (to eliminate the immune reaction) for ultimate transplanting
in humans. 9
The advantage of using animal donors is enormous once the rejection
problem is solved. There is no donor consent to obtain, there is a good
supply of donors available at all times, the definition of death never en-
ters the picture and the cost will be relatively cheap. Heterotransplants
of this sort are sure to play a part in the future of transplantation and
may well be one of the ultimate answers to today's problems.
G. Artificial Organs
The most recent source of organs for transplantation is the artificial
organ. Many of the same medical problems develop in this area as with
human organs. That is, rejection of the artificial organ occurs and blood
dotting occurs. But this is getting ahead of the story.
The initial problem with artificial organs is developing one that can
do the job. The artificial kidney is just such an organ. Although not
6 7 MOOR B at 139, 40.
68 Time Magazine, Sept. 20, 1968, (Transplants).
69 N. Y. Times (magazine) Apr. 21, 1968, at 118.
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thought of as an organ replacement it really is. That is, it performs the
same functions as a functioning kidney; it just happens to be a little bigger
and is outside of the body. The same is true for the artificial heart that
Dr. Michael E. DeBakey inserted in a woman patient on August 8, 1966,
at the Methodist Hospital, Houston, Texas. In this operation the plastic
artificial heart sustained a woman through a 31 -hour valve-replacement
operation and enabled her to survive post operative heart failure on the
sixth day. The artificial heart was removed on the 10th day after the
heart had healed.71 In the past several years the newspapers have period-
ically reported on the development of artificial arms controlled by cur-
rents from the wearer's muscles. The wearer simply thinks of moving
his arm and up it goes.71
The problem with all these organs is the size, weight and power sup-
ply. However, there is really no doubt that these problems will be solved.
One need only recall the recent Moon Flight of the Apollo in which a
miniature camera with a tremendous power supply was used to televise
pictures of the earth and the astronauts back to earth. In this day and age
engineering problems can be solved if enough man-hours and money are
donated to the problem.
Artificial organs will solve a great deal of problems in the same way
the animal-donated kidneys may. There will be no problem of donor
consent and no problem of definition of death. But other problems will
develop. One is bound to be the prohibitive cost of such an organ. Sili-
con and other new materials have been developed which, because of the
consistency of their surface, do not promote as severe a rejection reaction
as do other metals and animal tissues. These metals and procedures used
to produce them are bound to be expensive. The production of the min-
iature organs will result in a high price being charged for them. Thus
only the affluent will be able to survive unless the government subsidizes
the manufacturer of these organ replacements or pays the purchase price
for those who are unable to afford them.
Assuming the cost problems are met and artificial organs can be
easily obtained the lawyer and physician face a greater moral problem:
Should anybody be allowed to receive such an organ regardless of the
physical state of the rest of their body. To put it another way, should an
eighty year old man suffering from terminal cancer be allowed to have a
transplant? As long as there are enough organs to supply the needs of
the population the answer would seem to be yes. In those situations
where there are not enough organs to supply everyone's needs, a moral
question of social worth may be involved. This matter is discussed below.
70 BRITANNICA, BOOK OF THE YEAR 1967, at 528.
71 TYLOR, Tim BioLOGICAL TIME BOMB, 84 (1968).
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IV. RECIPIENTS
The recipient of a transplant organ presents the doctor with many
problems which he may not be able to handle without outside help. The
patients who suffer from acute renal failure or from heart disease have
much the same problem and therefore only the kidney patient will be
discussed. The patient enters the hospital without knowing what his
chances for recovery are or what he will have to undergo. Initially, he is
placed on a strict bland diet and undergoes peritoneal dialysis or hemo-
dialysis on the artifical kidney. The doctors use this method for one of
two reasons. First, the dialysis may relieve the kidneys of their function
so that they may rest and repair themselves. Second, it may be the only
way to keep the patient alive.
The transplant situation develops only in this second instance. The
procedure, at the present time, is fairly simple from there on. The pa-
tient is apprised of the situation and that without a transplant he will
soon die. As a result of the diagnosis, the patient agrees to a transplant,
which is explained to him in great detail, and he signs the appropriate
consent form." The surgical aspects of the procedure are explained to
72 THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF MEDICINE
CONSENT FOR RENAL TRANSPLANTATION
I, ---------------------------- agree to accept a kidney transplant from
either a living or cadaveric donor as determined by the physicians at O.S.U. Hospital.
In addition, I realize that a successful kidney transplant requires the taking of drugs to
control rejection that are still considered experimental. I agree to participate in the
antilymphocyte serum program with the understanding that this material is being
used as an aid in controlling rejection, and the possibility of the occurrence of fever,
local pain, and allergic side effects have been explained to me.
Witness ------------------------- Patient
Witness--------------------
The above form is that used by The Ohio State University Hospital.
REQUEST FOP, KIDNEY TRANSPLANT OPERATION
IN RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS
Whereas ---------------------- born on --------------- and residing on
has a serious kidney ailment and is in
danger of losing ____ life unless an operation is performed on ------ : and whereas
certain doctors connected with the -------------- Hospital are willing to perform
this operation upon the said -------------- in the hope of saving the life of the
said -------------- and whereas the doctors who propose to perform said opera-
tions and the -------------- Hospital and its staff of doctors and medical associ-
ates wish to be absolved from any and all liability, damages, law suits and causes of
action as a result of the operation, now therefore in consideration of the operation to
be performed and any further operations which may in the opinion of those doctors
be necessary therewith, we, ------ and ------------- , the intended
recipient of the operation and the intended donor fully realizing that the operation
may be unsuccessful and may result in either losing their life or in future physical in-
capacity, illness or illnesses directly or indirectly caused by said operation, we never-
theless both jointly and severally on behalf of ourselves, our heirs, administrators,
executors, and assigns do hereby request that said operation be performed upon
and hereby RELEASE AND FOREVER DISCHARGE the
Hospital, its director, and all persons on its medical or surgical
staff who are in any way directly or indirectly connected with said operations or any
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the patient who is told that tissue transplantation is still considered exper-
imental, that the experience may be painful and that the success can not
be guaranteed.
The next problem involves the finding of a donor. The general prac-
tice is for the potential recipient to contact the members of his family
to secure a donor. The relatives come in and undergo a tissue typing
test to ascertain whether or not there is suitable histocompatability. When
a match is found the dangers and risks are explained to the donor. If
there is no suitable donor, then the search turns to the cadaveric donor.
As the Ohio State University consent form indicates, the physicians have
the final say as to whether a cadaveric donor's or live donor's kidney is
used. Generally, the patient takes whatever he can get and is happy for
it. Assuming there is a donor, the operation proceeds and hopefully the
recipient recovers to lead a normal and productive life.
Inherent in this scheme are few legal problems (other than consent).
As the surgeon's skills in transplantation grow and the rejection mech-
anism is successfully combated a great many problems will be created. It
has been estimated that 50,000 heart attack victims a year in the United
States alone could benefit from new hearts.73 The prefatory note to the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act indicates that between 6,000 and 10,000
lives could be saved each year by renal transplants.
As the public and medical spheres develop confidence in transplanta-
tion procedures, more and more people will turn to them as the last resort.
other future operations resulting from them, for our post-operative care while in the
------------- Hospital, from all damages or causes of action, either at law or in
equity, which we may have or acquire or which may accrue to us, our heirs, admin-
istrators, executors or assigns as a result of these operations or medical care arising
therefrom. We intend this to be a complete RELEASE AND DISCHARGE of all
persons as well as any corporate entity having anything to do with the operations and
we intend hereby to RELEASE AND FOREVER DISCHARGE said persons from all
liability whatsoever. It is clearly understood by all parties to this instrument that no
representations have been made to any of us regarding the success of the operations,
and we fully understand that said operations are somewhat in the nature of an ex-
periment and are being performed in the hope of saving the life of the said --------
We have read all the statements contained herein and we fully realize that we are
signing a complete release and bar to any further claims which we may have resulting
from these operations.
DONOR REcIpIENT*
PARENT PARENT
WITNE SS
DATE
*Should recipient be a minor, the signature of both parents must be obtained.
The above form entitled Request for Kidney Transplant Operation... appeared in Wasmuth
& Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV.
442, 469 (1965).
73 Dr. William Likoff, a Philadelphia transplant pioneer and out-going president of the
American College of Cardiology, quoted in N.Y. Times (magazine), April 21, 1968, at 117.
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It is to be expected that the number of organs suitable for transplantation
will expand as the various sources previously discussed reach their full
potential. But it is impossible to believe that these sources will be suf-
ficient to meet the demand within the next few years. Therefore, a
means of selecting recipients, a means of determining who shall live and
who shall die, must be established. The medical profession is generally
opposed to any intervention into their field but in this instance they are
simply not qualified to make the decision. At the present time the phy-
sician, if he should have to decide who gets the transplant, generally
chooses the sickest of those eligible. However, this may not be the best
criterion. To say that a man of 85 years with cancer of the stomach in
need of a heart should receive one before his 25 year old grandson who
has five dependents and no physical defects other than an extremely
poor heart is absurd. The physician is simply not trained to make deci-
sions as to the relative merits of who should receive limited transplants.
Once again the lawyer should cooperate in establishing committees of
qualified persons to make such decisions and in developing criteria on
which to base these decisions. These committees are discussed below.
In a 1968 article in the UCLA Law Review, David Sanders, M.D.,
and Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., Professor of Law at UCLA discussed this prob-
lem in the same way that they discussed hemodialysis. Their evaluation
of the situation is very comprehensive and will be repeated to a large
extent here.74
The number of people requiring hemodialysis far exceeds the number
actually receiving treatment. Therefore some criteria and method of se-
lection must be chosen. In a few hemodialysis centers a medical evalua-
tion is made, followed by psychiatric, social worth and financial evalua-
tion by a medical committee, a lay committee or a committee composed
of both medical and non-medical personnel.
Only physicians licensed to practice medicine in California are author-
ized to refer patients. The initial contact is with the medical director,
who advises the physician concerning the course of action he considers
indicated.
If the patient is to be evaluated at the center, referral forms are pro-
vided and a date of evaluation set. Transportation costs to the center
and costs for evaluation are borne by the patient, his family or by third
party payments. Patients found medically suitable for chronic hemo-
dialysis, on original evaluation, are then referred to a Patient Selection
Committee composed of physicians, social workers, rehabilitation workers
and other specialists as indicated.
The committee then considers the patient from an overall standpoint
as to the feasibility of accepting him for the program. Upon selection,
74 Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advances and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney Trans-
plantation, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 357 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Medical Advances].
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a plan of payment for services is arranged and chronic hemodialysis is
initiated.75
Of the psychiatric evaluation, cooperation is the most important charac-
teristic in that the patient, to recover, must adjust to a new diet, must
expect some complications and reversals, and must adjust to a dependence
on the machine as well as the stress and strain of being saved twice a
week.7
6
The Seattle Artificial Kidney Center at the University of Washing-
ton bases its decisions upon an evaluation of the candidate by an anony-
mous committee which determines the social worth of the candidate.
Dr. Belding H. Scribner, of the University of Washington in Seattle
supports the idea of weeding out candidates by a civilian board in order
to represent the community and assure that choices are made effectively,
without outside pressure.
All candidates for treatment must be under 40 years of age. They
must be self supporting and residents of the State of Washington. A
first panel, composed of physicians eliminates the medically unfit.
The second panel consists of ... a clergyman, a housewife, a banker,
a labor leader and two physicians. This group makes the final decision,
and they remain anonymous in order to be protected from public pres-
sures.
This civilian group bases its decisions on social and economic criteria.
Other factors equal, the group chooses those with dependents. It favors
patients who are stable in their behavior and appear to be emotionally
mature. To have a record of public service is a help-scout leader, Sun-
day school teacher, Red Cross volunteer. They frown on those who
have a record of skipping appointments.77
In the San Francisco General Hospital the general criteria "are medical
data indicating that the patient is suitable to this treatment and voca-
tional data indicating that the patient can be effectively rehabilitated with
the treatment. Other social values must not influence the decision."7 s
The Los Angeles Center uses a different system for selection of candi-
dates to receive hemodialysis:
The patient's medical, psychiatric and sociologic history [are] re-
viewed and the patient [is] judged to be either an optimum or alternate
candidate largely on the basis of medical findings.
An optimum candidate is a patient who is disabled because of chronic
renal insufficiency and who does not have any other disabling illness or
significant organ involvement. Patients who have cerebrovascular acci-
7 5 Breslow, Public Health Report, Calif. Med. 360 (1967) quoted in Medical Advances at
367.
761d. at 368-369.
77 RMBOOI, Nov. 1967 at 132-33.
78 Northern California Chronic Hemodialysis Center, Procedure for Selection of Patients for
Chronic Hemodialysis Therapy, 2 (mimeograph 1967), quoted in 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 267,
372 (1968).
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dents with paralyses, severe coronary artery disease and heart failure,
another disabling systemic disease or who show unwillingness to cooperate
with the prescribed hemodialysis program are examples of alternate candi-
dates. Each time an opening occurs on the program, all referrals [are]
classified into one or the other category. The group of optimum candi-
dates will be pooled and one of them will be selected by lot for therapy.
If there are no optimum candidates, then the alternate pool will be used to
draw the patient for treatment.79
The selection process on the basis of social worth, as typified by the
Seattle Center's process of selection, has not yet been tested by law. But
this is an area in which grave constitutional errors may be committed.
Many of the hospitals performing organ transplants are either state sup-
ported or perform the work through support from Federal grants. In
this day it is certainly not inconceivable that equal protection objectives
could be raised if certain age or racial groups were discriminated against.
In the selection processes discussed above no definitive standards have
been articulated. For this reason there may be constitutional objections
on the basis of procedural due process. The answer may be in establish-
ing criteria of social worth but this has not yet proved successful, if it has
even been done. The problem with determining social worth is that no
one is at present able to make an objective determination of the relative
merits of characteristics of personality, dependence and past accomplish-
ments without personal biases and prejudices entering the picture-perhaps
unnoticed.
For instance, how can the following persons and personalities be
ranked when there is just one organ available: President Eisenhower,
Edward Kennedy, 0. J. Simpson, an inmate at the Ohio State Penitentiary,
a hard working citizen who is the father of three, Elizabeth Taylor,
Billy Graham, The Pope, Rap Brown, Pat Nixon. Inherent in such a list
is that any one of these persons might be chosen if the right standards
and selection committee were used. That is, almost everyone has some
social worth to somebody. Such a decision is almost impossible until
standards have been perfected and the selection process is conducted by
trained personnel.
One suggested answer is to have physicians and hospital personnel do
the evaluating. This system is just as bad as the previous one. To begin
with, the physician is no more competent to judge social worth than any
other member of society. Second, the medical profession has an obliga-
tion to society to act on the basis of experience and education. By step-
ping outside these boundaries, that faith which the public has developed
79 Barbour, Meihaus, Berne Le Orellana, Los Angeles County General Hospital Renal-Dialy-
sis Center, Operational Plans I, at 3 (mimeograph 1967), quoted in 15 U.C.L.A. L Rev. 267,
372 (1968).
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in the medical profession may dwindle to the point that the public is not
willing to donate organs or undergo transplantations. Then a real dis-
service has been done to mankind.
What is the answer? This is difficult and may be some years in the
making. It is in this area that lawyers may find themselves best able to
help. Just as with today's draft laws, there may be no perfect system but
almost any is better than the type currently in use in these West Coast
Centers. Again a reference to the draft problem suggests at least one al-
ternative: a lottery. After a medical examination those persons who need
a transplant and are in such a state of physical well being that they could
survive and lead a normal life in the event of successful transplantation
could be placed in a pool and names selected at random. There would
be separate pools for different types of transplants and for different
genetic construction. Those in the pool at the end of a certain time pe-
riod-perhaps 6 months--could be re-examined to determine physical
well being, and, if satisfactory, thrown back into the pool. The pools
would never reach gigantic proportions because of the nature of the ill-
ness of the potential recipients. Many would never live long enough to
be re-examined, and even if they did, their condition would be so dete-
riorated that they would no longer be eligible for a transplant.
A second possibility is the old "'first-come, first served" idea. Here
the potential recipient would be medically examined to determine suit-
ability for transplant. The first recipient who happened to be compatible
with the first organ presented for transplantation would get it-assuming
that the chances for a successful transplant were still good at the time the
organ was available. If the recipient had deteriorated somewhat in his
condition he would simply not qualify as a recipient. This is hard but
then again no profession has easy decisions to make.
A third system would involve a priority based on criteria not yet for-
mulated. Before too many years go by statistical studies by sociologists will
reveal just how social worth can be determined. The only reason why
such a study has not yet been completed is because it is difficult, time
consuming, expensive and heretofore unnecessary. Now, since there is a
need, a system of criteria can be developed which will withstand the con-
stitutional objections previously stated.
At the present time a selection of recipients is necessary only in those
situations where a donor dies having willed his organs to an institution or
a physician without specifying who the recipient is to be. In all other
cases, especially with live donors, the recipient is known and has usually
procured the organ source himself. When there is talk of procuring
organs the subject eventually shifts to whether or not organs should be
paid for. This is not a new question because of the fact that blood donors
are often times paid for their donations. But organs are a little different.
1970]
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There are several conflicting viewpoints on this subject. G. A. Leach
has suggested:
that selling one's organs is ethically acceptable (though perhaps not so-
dally desirable). We already pay money to people to face major risks to
health and to life, and these payments are deliberate incentives to them
to put themselves in a situation which carries a definite risk of death. A
much more common situation is that high fees are offered for work
which involves pressures on our bodies that are a definite risk to health
-the case of business executives for example.80
Dr. Jean Hamburger has stated
•.. [I]t is safer to try to discourage, rather than encourage, donors. Giv-
ing money for a kidney would have the opposite effect. Our basic rule
must be to avoid any kind of pressure (including financial) on the pro-
spective donor.8 '
The fact is that volunteers are getting paid for experimental work done in
other fields of medicine and it may well spread to transplantation. There-
fore, some definite stand must be taken.
Although the donor has been the subject of discussion, the recipient's
financial resources and ability to pay for organs lie at the root of this
problem. This ability to pay is one other criteria for determining who
is to receive transplants. Although there may be no reason to prevent ill
patients from purchasing organs from the recipient's side, there are many
reasons for preventing it from the donor's side. A potential recipient of
great wealth could exert a tremendous amount of coercive influence on a
poor donor with a large family. This is a situation which is morally
wrong and should not be promoted for any reason. If it were possible to
establish a set price for such organs the objections would not be so great.
However, there does not, at the present time, appear to be any method of
determining such value.
The same considerations do not apply to payment for cadaveric donors.
A donor could sell his organs, conditioned on his death first. This could
serve as a type of insurance policy with the payments to be made to the
next of kin. Payment could also be made to the donor himself at the
time he grants consent. Provisions would have to be made for revocation
because it would seem to be contrary to public policy to specifically en-
force such a contract. In this type of situation the amount of coercion
due to monetary pressure would not be so great because of the fact that
the recipient would have to wait some time for the organs and therefore
would not be willing to expend quite the same amount of money as for
immediate receipt from a live donor.
Once again this is an area where the physician and lawyer must com-
8 0 M IcAL ETiCS at 35, 36. [Leach is the science correspondent for the New Statesman
(Penguin Books).]
81 MEDICAL ETHIcs at 37.
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bine their talents to work out codes of conduct or legislation approp-
riately designed to solve the problems. A simple legislative enactment
would prevent payment to donors except upon death. It may be neces-
sary. There is also the problem of the donor's survivors being contacted
and selling the organs before the death of the donor. A legislative pro-
vision stating that such contracts were void unless entered into after the
donor's death might help this problem.
V. CONCLUSION
Transplantation has ushered a new era into the field of medicine.
To utilize the knowledge gained thus far, medical personnel must find
solutions to many moral, medical and legal problems. There is no ques-
tion but that scientific research will provide the answers to the medical
problems; but other disciplines must be called in to provide solutions, or
means to solutions, for the other problems which have been presented in
the preceding pages. The general public turns to the legal profession
whenever it appears that its moral and legal rights are in the process of
being violated. The lawyer has been placed in the position of protector of
these rights and thus has a position of professional responsibility to these
people.
Just what is this responsibility and how does it relate to transplanta-
tion and those problems presented earlier? In the field of transplanta-
tion there are many competing forces. The surgeon may want to trans-
plant and thus does not have the best interest of the patient at heart; the
potential recipient may not have the best interests of the donor at heart;
the general public's future welfare may be at odds with the welfare of a
particular donor or recipient. How are these conflicting interests to be
settled? This is the problem for the lawyer. His obligation runs further
than just waiting for tragedy to occur and then attempting a solution in
concert with the medical profession; he must actively define the interests
involved and pose solutions which will be available to handle the prob-
lems as they develop.
In developing these solutions the lawyer must consider the fol-
lowing: The field of transplantation has produced medical results which
are desirable if the surgical procedures are carried out properly. Trans-
plantation can continue to develop only as long as the general public has
confidence in it. Transplantation is a new and experimental field which
the general public does not readily understand. Transplantation will con-
tinue to develop as a life saving technique only as long as the general
public has trust and confidence in the surgeons and allied medical person-
nel performing the operation. Should the general public lose confi-
dence in the physicians and their transplantation surgery, the general
public will no longer donate organs and submit to these experimental
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procedures. If transplantation ceases, the general public and future gen-
erations will suffer in that countless numbers of people will die unneces-
sarily.
It is the professional responsibility of the lawyer to see to it that ex-
perimental transplantation continues to develop and expand so that lives
may be saved and, at the same time, protect the rights of members of the
public so that they are treated as human beings and not guinea pigs for
experimental procedures. A solution to this problem is dependent upon
two principles. First, there must be a full disclosure to those involved
so that their consent may be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. It is for
this reason that certain limitations, such as minimum age, maximum age,
and health standards must exist. Second, there should be an adversary
system set up in the medical profession. Such a system is envisioned in
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and has a great deal of merit. Such a
system would require that the various aspects of transplantation and med-
icine have different physicians performing the functions. These phy-
sicians would have opposing goals. The example pointed out earlier is in
the case of a dying man whose organs may be valuable to someone else.
The transplant surgeon may want him declared dead as soon as possible,
but the attending physician, who has no interest in the transplantation
itself, wants his patient to recover. These competing interests should be
resolved to insure that the donor gets the benefit of all available medical
treatment.
The reason for such a system does not lie in the fact the medical per-
sonnel are immoral or unethical. It lies in the fact that the general pub-
lic wants insurance that its rights are being protected and that the doctor
and lawyer can say, "here is our system, see how it protects you". Al-
though the medical profession might oppose such a system at first, a little
consideration leads to the conclusion that it may increase public confi-
dence and result in increased transplantation.
The big question, of course, is one of implementation. The easiest
method is legislation, and perhaps it is the only method. Legislatures
should not try to enter into the field of medicine by telling physicians
and hospitals how to operate, transplant, define death, and choose recip-
ients for transplant operations. However, legislatures could force hospi-
tals and medical staffs to adopt standards for each of these areas. It
could also be provided that doctors who conform to these standards are
absolved from civil liability. Standards such as these could be shown to
the donor and recipient in order to prove that their rights were protected.
A strict compliance with the standards would allow a doctor to know
what his medical responsibilities are and what his legal liabilities would
be if he violated these standards.
Many of the problems presented are not susceptible to an immediate
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answer for the reasons that the parameters of the problem are not yet so-
lidified. Animal donors and artificial organs are just beginning to create
problems and shall continue to do so. In five years problems which we
know now may no longer be present or may have been solved. But others
will present themselves. The lawyers active in this area must anticipate
these problems and attempt to minimize the adverse effects. They must
provide a system which allows the physicians to undertake controlled ex-
perimentation in order to help man in the future and yet protect the rights
of those men who necessarily must be subjected to such experimentation-
this is the lawyer's professional responsibility.
